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IN RE ADOPTION OF GUSTAVO G.
(decided April 22, 2004)
ABIGAIL ZIGMAN*
The United States Supreme Court stated “[t]here are few of
the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence
than that of attorney and client . . .”1  A lawyer has an ethical obliga-
tion to be a zealous advocate for his client, remain loyal, and pre-
serve his client’s confidences.2  In the course of an attorney-client
relationship, situations may arise where a lawyer’s very involvement
in a matter may offend the trust and confidence essential to that
relationship.  In these situations, though no actual conflict of inter-
est may exist, an “inherent conflict of interest” (i.e. the potential for
or the appearance of a conflict of interest) remains.3  In order to
preserve the integrity of the attorney-client relationship when an
inherent conflict of interest arises, a lawyer should avoid involve-
ment in the matter, though he may not be ethically mandated to do
so by court rules.  By withdrawing himself from a matter in which
an inherent conflict of interest exists, a lawyer enhances public con-
fidence in the judicial system4 and avoids causing injury to potential
clients.  This promotes the values articulated by the Supreme Court
that are essential to the attorney-client relationship.
In In re Adoption of Gustavo G.,5 the New York Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, addressed the issue of whether a law firm
that represented a foster care agency in terminating the parental
rights of a child under the care of the agency could subsequently
represent a person seeking to adopt the child.  The court held that
because the interests of the foster care agency and the person seek-
* J.D. Candidate 2006, New York Law School.
1. Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
2. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1980) (Canons 4, 5, 7, and 9
of the Model Code include rules concerning loyalty, zealous representation, and ap-
pearances of impropriety).
3. In re Adoption of Gustavo G., 776 N.Y.S.2d 15, 25 (1st Dep’t 2004) (Tom, J.,
dissenting).
4. Id.
5. 776 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1st Dep’t 2004).
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ing adoption were aligned, no conflict of interest existed.6  This
Case Comment contends that the Appellate Division’s holding was
too broad.  The continued representation by the law firm of the
foster care agency in other parental rights termination proceedings
during the law firm’s representation of the prospective adoptive
parent created an “inherent conflict of interest” which should have
led to the law firm’s disqualification.7  Excluding this type of inher-
ent conflict of interest, but allowing representation of an adoptive
parent when there is no continued representation of a foster care
agency, would advance the placement of the child in a home and
promote the core elements on which the attorney-client relation-
ship are based.
In In re Adoption of Gustavo G., Gustavo, a four-year-old boy, was
taken from his mother as a result of her drug abuse and placed with
the Administration for Children’s Services on March 3, 2000.8  He
was subsequently transferred to Angel Guardian Children and Fam-
ily Services (Angel Guardian).9  Since March 13, 2000, Gustavo con-
tinuously resided with petitioner, his maternal grandmother.10
Warren & Warren, P.C. represented Angel Guardian in terminating
the parental rights of Gustavo’s biological mother and alleged fa-
ther.11  Subsequently, petitioner sought the legal representation of
Warren & Warren to help her adopt Gustavo.12  Before Warren &
Warren agreed to represent the petitioner, the firm advised her
that when there is dual representation, a situation might arise re-
sulting in a disqualifying conflict of interest.13  The petitioner de-
cided to retain Warren & Warren despite this possibility.14  While
Warren & Warren represented the petitioner, it continued to re-
6. Id. at 18-19.
7. Id. at 25 (Tom, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id.
11. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Warren & Warren were obligated to obtain the petitioner’s consent because
the possibility existed that the firm’s interests would impair the judgment of its lawyers
because the firm was previously employed by Angel Guardian to terminate the rights of
Gustavo’s biological parents. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101
(1980) (stating that “[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a law-
yer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf
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present Angel Guardian in other unrelated termination of parental
rights matters.15  On November 6, 2002, represented by Warren &
Warren, Gustavo’s grandmother filed a petition seeking to adopt
Gustavo.16
After receiving the adoption petition, the Bronx County Family
Court, sua sponte, issued an order to show cause as to why it should
not dismiss the petition in light of Warren & Warren’s prior repre-
sentation of the foster care agency.17  Though the court did not
find an actual conflict of interest, it relied on a New York State Bar
Association ethics opinion18 to find that Warren & Warren’s repre-
sentation of the petitioner was impermissible.19  The ethics opinion
stated that a law firm should not, after representing a foster care
agency in the termination of parental rights, represent the prospec-
tive adoptive parents.20  The Bar Association contended that this
would create the appearance of professional impropriety.21
of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, prop-
erty, or personal interests.”).
15. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (Tom, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. at 17.
18. NYSBA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 708 (1998).
19. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
20. NYSBA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 708 (1998).  Generally, professional ethics
opinions opined by state bar associations are not binding; they are issued to lend gui-
dance to decision-making bodies.  SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING
THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 537 (2004).
21. NYSBA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 708 (1998).  The New York State Bar Asso-
ciation’s opinion relied heavily upon MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101.
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) states that “[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment
in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.”
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1980).  The New York State Bar
Association ruled that DR 9-101(B) could be extended to a private foster care agency
where its purpose is to serve the system of justice.  By serving the system of justice, it
therefore acts as a public agency, and the lawyer, in turn, essentially constitutes a public
employee.  The Bar Association ruled that DR 9-101(B) was intended to “ensure the
public’s confidence in public agencies and public processes. . ..”  NYSBA Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics Op. 708 (1998).  Because the public might perceive an attorney who works
for a foster care agency and subsequently is employed by prospective adoptive parents
in relation to the foster care proceedings as using the agency for a private advantage,
the Bar Association urged that this type of representation would adversely affect the
public’s confidence in the foster care agency creating the appearance of impropriety
and would violate DR 9-101(B). Id.  Both the concurrence and the dissent in Gustavo
adopted this argument. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 21-29.  The majority contended that
DR 9-101(B) is not invoked in this situation. Id. at 21.
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Though Warren & Warren argued that the petitioner was fully ad-
vised about the possibility of disqualification if a conflict of interest
arose and that in over twenty-five years the firm had never been
questioned about its ability to recognize conflicts of interest,22 the
Family Court applied a per se disqualification rule.23  As a result,
the court dismissed Gustavo’s grandmother’s adoption petition
without prejudice.24
Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Appellate Division reversed
the Family Court’s order with direction to the Family Court to com-
plete the adoption.25  First, the court found that no law, ethical or
otherwise, prohibited Warren & Warren’s actions with regard to its
representation of Angel Guardian and the petitioner.26  The court
reasoned that no actual conflict of interest existed because Angel
Guardian was a former client with respect to the termination pro-
ceeding, the petitioner was Warren & Warren’s current client with
respect to Gustavo’s adoption proceeding, and the petitioner de-
cided to retain Warren & Warren despite the advice that a conflict
of interest might arise.27  The Social Services Law governing the au-
thority of agencies to place foster care children with adoptive par-
ents provided only that “[n]o attorney or law firm shall serve as the
attorney for, or provide any legal services to both the natural par-
ents and adoptive parents.”28  Therefore, the court held, the repre-
sentation in question was legally permissible.29
Second, the court held that Warren & Warren could represent
Angel Guardian and subsequently represent Gustavo’s grand-
mother because their interests were aligned.30  Courts have tradi-
22. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id. at 17.
28. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2000).
29. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 17.  Although the dissent found that an inherent con-
flict of interest existed, the dissent did concede that “no actual conflict between peti-
tioner and the foster care agency” existed. Id. at 29 (Tom. J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 17-19.  The court considered MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105 which provides, in part, that, “[a] ‘lawyer may represent multiple clients if a disin-
terested lawyer would believe that the lawyer can completely represent the interest of
each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the implications
of the simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks involved.’” Id. at 17
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tionally permitted attorneys to engage in dual representation when
their clients’ interests are so aligned that there is almost no chance
of a conflict of interest arising.31  Conversely, courts have barred
dual representation when clients’ interests diverge.32  Not only were
Angel Guardian and the petitioner’s interests aligned, but the court
found that a compelling reason justified the representation.  The
court stated that when the interests of clients are aligned, as in this
situation, the placement of a child in a permanent home is likely to
happen quickly.33
Lastly, the court allowed Warren & Warren’s dual representa-
tion of Angel Guardian and the petitioner because doing so pro-
tected the petitioner’s right to choose her own counsel.34  The
court stated that in the absence of an actual conflict of interest, the
court must adhere to a party’s choice of counsel.35  For these rea-
sons, the Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s dismissal of
the adoption petition.
In his concurrence, Judge Marlow contended that in cases
where a law firm represented a foster care agency in a parental
rights termination proceeding, and subsequently represented a per-
son seeking adoption of the child, the court should appoint a law
guardian.36  The law guardian, Judge Marlow argued, would remain
with the child throughout the adoptive proceedings, thereby pro-
viding the child with a representative whose sole loyalty lies with
(quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105).  However, the court recog-
nized that this was not a case of multiple employment. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
31. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (citing In re Harley v. Ziems, 469 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129
(2d Dep’t 1983)).  The court recognized that the present case involves successive repre-
sentation as opposed to dual representation as it existed in the above-cited case. Gus-
tavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19.
32. See In re Adoption A. and Another, 733 N.Y.S.2d 571, 576 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
Queens County 2001); Solow v. W.R. Grace & Co., 83 N.Y.2d 303, 306 (1994).  Simulta-
neous representation of clients with differing interests is not only discouraged through
opinions of the court, but engaging in this type of representation is a violation of the
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY.  Specifically, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) states
in part that, “a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if. . .it would be likely to
involve the lawyer in representing differing interests. . .” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(B) (1980).
33. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
34. Id. at 18 (citing Solow, 83 N.Y.2d 303).
35. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
36. Id. at 22 (Marlow, J., concurring).
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that child.37  Even where no actual conflict of interest exists, Judge
Marlow advised that a law guardian be appointed.38  Judge Marlow
stated that though he did not agree with dual representation, espe-
cially where no law guardian was involved, it was not within the
court’s purview to disallow it.39  Because social services law did not
speak to the propriety of a law firm representing an adoption
agency and an adoptive parent, he contended, it was not for the
court to disallow but, rather, it was the legislature’s responsibility to
correct.40
Judge Tom dissented.  He argued that a law firm that had rep-
resented a foster care agency in a parental rights termination pro-
ceeding cannot subsequently represent the person seeking
adoption of that child.41  Judge Tom contended that this type of
representation presented an inherent conflict of interest.42  He ar-
gued that though the interests of the foster care agency and the
adoptive parent might be aligned at the beginning of a law firm’s
representation of an adoptive parent, there existed the possibility
that during the course of the representation, their interests might
splinter.43  If this occurred, Judge Tom argued, the law firm, if it
continued its representation, would be disloyal to one of its
clients.44
In his dissent Judge Tom also considered the fact that Warren
& Warren, while representing the petitioner, continued to re-
present Angel Guardian in unrelated parental rights termination
proceedings.45  Judge Tom argued that a law firm engaging in this
type of ongoing representation might follow the judgment of the
37. Id.
38. Id. at 23 (Marlow, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id.
41. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (Tom, J., dissenting). Accord In re Adoption A., 733
N.Y.S.2d at 577; In re Adoption of Vincent, 602 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. New
York County 1993). See also NYSBA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 708 (1998) (discussing
same).
42. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (Tom, J., dissenting).
43. Id.  The dissent provided an example of such an instance.  Judge Tom stated
that new information may come to light causing the foster care agency to rescind its
recommendation of adoption of the child by the putative adoptive parent. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 27 (Tom, J., dissenting).  The majority did not address this fact in any of
the arguments it put forth in its opinion.
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agency in a particular adoption, not the adoptive parent the firm
also represented, because of the continuous relationship it main-
tained with the foster care agency.46  In addition, in an effort to
please the foster care agency and secure future employment, a law-
yer might disregard the best interests of the child and agree to re-
present the adoptive parent upon recommendation of the foster
care agency.47  This would impair the public’s confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system.  It would also give the impression
that attorneys used foster care agencies to further their own goals.48
For these reasons, Judge Tom concluded that the court should have
affirmed the Family Court’s decision to disqualify Warren & Warren
as the petitioner’s counsel.49
Under Gustavo, a law firm may represent a foster care agency
in a parental rights termination proceeding and subsequently re-
present a person seeking adoption of the same child even though
an ongoing attorney-client relationship exists between the foster
care agency and the law firm in other unrelated proceedings.50  Al-
lowing a law firm to first represent a foster care agency and then an
adoptive parent does not represent an actual conflict of interest.51
In fact, it can enhance the best interests of the child to be
adopted.52  However, allowing this type of representation when an
ongoing attorney-client relationship exists between the foster care
agency and the law firm creates an inherent conflict of interest.
This inherent conflict of interest should be prohibited.  The major-
ity’s holding in Gustavo should be limited to only permit represen-
tation of the adoptive parent when no ongoing relationship exists
between the foster care agency and the law firm.  This allows for the
advantages that accompany this type of successive representation
but prevents the potential for impropriety, the appearance of im-
propriety, and breaches of confidentiality.
46. Id. at 27-28.
47. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (Tom, J., dissenting) (citing In re Adoption A., 733
N.Y.S.2d 571).
48. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (Tom, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 29 (Tom, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 17-18.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 19.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR405.txt unknown Seq: 8 29-APR-05 9:48
1250 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
When there is no ongoing relationship between the foster care
agency and the law firm that represented the adoptive parent, cer-
tain benefits that accompany this type of successive relationship re-
main.  For example, as the majority contended, when a law firm
represents a foster care agency and subsequently represents the
prospective adoptive parent, “a coordinated approach to the dispo-
sition of [the] matter. . .”53 ensues and “. . .the public interest in
securing a permanent home for the child in a most expeditious
manner”54 is furthered.  Additionally, allowing the law firm to re-
present the adoptive parent respects a person’s choice of counsel.55
However, when there is an ongoing relationship between the foster
care agency and the law firm, three essential problems present
themselves.
The first fundamental problem that arises when a law firm rep-
resents an adoptive parent while simultaneously representing a fos-
ter care agency in unrelated matters is the potential for
impropriety.  The potential for impropriety exists when, as the dis-
sent argued, a foster care agency recommends that a law firm re-
present an adoptive parent.56  Though Judge Marlow, in his
concurrence, noted that in an overwhelming majority of cases,
where a law firm represents a foster care agency and an adoptive
parent, the parties have a child’s best interests at heart,57 he further
remarked that “history surely knows cases where. . .the child’s best
interests have been secondary, or even worse, irrelevant, to an
adult’s agenda.”58  If a foster care agency recommends that a law
firm represent an adoptive parent, the possibility exists that the law
firm would agree regardless of whether the representation was in
the child’s best interest.  The law firm would agree to the represen-
tation in order to please its long-term client and ensure that it re-
tained its ongoing business with the foster care agency.59  If,
however, a law firm did not maintain an ongoing relationship with
the foster care agency the potential for this impropriety would not
53. Id.
54. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id. at 28 (Tom, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 22 (Marlow, J., concurring).
58. Id. 
59. Id. (citing In re Adoption A., 733 N.Y.S.2d 571).
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exist.  This is because the incentive to retain the foster care agency
as a client would not be present, leaving the law firm to consider
only the child’s best interest when determining whether to re-
present the adoptive parent.  Therefore, in order to avoid a situa-
tion where a child’s interests are subordinated to the interests of a
law firm, a law firm should terminate its ongoing representation of
a foster care agency before pursuing representation of a person
seeking adoption of a child under the agency’s care.
Second, a law firm should not only avoid the potential for im-
propriety but it should also avoid the appearance of impropriety.
The notion that lawyers should avoid even the appearance of im-
propriety in their representation of clients is well-settled.60  Indeed,
the New York Court of Appeals stated that certain appearances of
impropriety should be no less condemned than the improprieties
themselves.61  The appearance of impropriety erodes public confi-
dence in attorneys.62  The type of dual representation present in
Gustavo, for example, might lead the public to perceive that attor-
neys are driven by their own interests, regardless of what is in the
best interest of a child.63  The appearance of impropriety also er-
odes confidence in agencies whose mission it is to serve public
ends, such as foster care agencies.64  Foster care agencies serve in
the interest of children but if these agencies are perceived as acting
in their own interests without regard for the children to be
adopted, the integrity of these agencies will diminish.65  As shown
above, the appearance of impropriety largely impacts the way in
which the public views societal institutions and attorneys.  There-
fore, an ongoing attorney-client relationship, such as the one be-
tween Warren & Warren and Angel Guardian, should be prohibited
because without it, no such appearance of impropriety would exist.
60. See People v. Abar, 99 N.Y.2d 406, 412 (2003) (Smith, J., dissenting); In re
Commitment of T’Challa, 766 N.Y.S.2d 500, 505 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Kings County 2003),
aff’d, In re T’Challa D., 770 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep’t 2004); Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. and
Annuity Ass’n, 93 N.Y.2d 611, 618 (1999); Solow, 83 N.Y.2d at 306; Abbondanza v.
Siegel, 619 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (4th Dep’t 1994).
61. In re Schiff, 83 N.Y.2d 689, 693 (1994) (citing In re Spector v. State Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct, 47 N.Y.2d 462, 466 (1979)).
62. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 29 (Tom, J., dissenting).
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 24 (Marlow, J., concurring).
65. Id.
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Finally, when a law firm maintains an ongoing relationship
with a foster care agency while simultaneously representing a pro-
spective adoptive parent, it raises concerns about confidentiality.
Confidentiality is a core professional obligation dating back to the
seventeenth century.66  Maintaining a client’s confidence encour-
ages “full and frank” discussion between the client and the lawyer.67
Having all of the information pertaining to an issue will enable the
lawyer to perform his job better.68  Because of the role confidential-
ity plays in the attorney-client relationship, a client has a right to
expect that his confidences will not be revealed.69  But in this in-
stance, because of the ongoing relationship between Warren &
Warren and Angel Guardian, there was a greater risk that peti-
tioner’s confidences concerning the adoption would have been re-
vealed to Angel Guardian.70
When adopting a child a prospective adoptive parent is re-
quired to make many disclosures to the agency facilitating the
adoption.71  The possibility of breaching a client’s confidentiality,
then, occurs when an attorney is privy to information that the client
is not required to disclose, but which the attorney may nevertheless
regard as useful to the foster care agency it continually represents.
For example, a foster care agency does not require that an appli-
cant disclose his sexual orientation.72  Though applicants cannot be
rejected based on their sexual preferences,73 they may not desire
that this aspect of their lives be revealed to the agency.  If the pro-
66. See Martyn & Fox, supra note 20, at 122 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An
Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069-70 (1978)).
67. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
68. See Martyn & Fox, supra note 20, at 122 (citing Deborah L. Rhode & Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 64 (2002)) (arguing that
lacking relevant information increases the likelihood that a lawyer will either apply the
wrong law or give incorrect legal advice or both).
69. In re Commitment of T’Challa, 766 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).
70. See Abbondanza, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (holding that a likelihood of confidential
information being exploited existed when a law firm maintained a continuous relation-
ship with one client while it was representing a different client against the former
client).
71. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.15 (1981).  Examples of such
disclosures include medical conditions, marital status, criminal record, and salary.
72. Id. at § 421.15(c).
73. Id. at § 421.16(h)(2).
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spective adoptive parent discloses this fact to his attorney, however,
the attorney may reveal it to the agency.  Another example of infor-
mation an applicant may not want revealed is occurrences of past
depression.  Despite being required to submit a report from a physi-
cian on the applicant’s health,74 the examination may not reveal
past mental illness.  Even though an agency is prohibited from re-
jecting an applicant on the basis of past psychiatric illness or treat-
ment,75 the applicant may not want this fact revealed.  A final
example of a confidence that risks being exposed involves employ-
ment.  An applicant is required to submit to an agency evidence of
employment and salary,76 but nothing requires him to reveal the
possibility of lost employment.77  If an applicant reveals to his attor-
ney that, due to a strained financial position, his employer is con-
templating laying workers off the attorney might be inclined to
alert the agency of such a possibility.  However, the applicant may
not want this fact revealed.  Therefore, the most effective means of
preventing the type of confidential information mentioned above
from reaching a foster care agency is for an attorney who represents
a prospective adoptive parent to terminate an ongoing relationship
with such agency.
Because of the prolonged relationship between Warren & War-
ren and Angel Guardian, the law firm likely had detailed informa-
tion regarding the foster care agency.  Because such information
would be of interest to a prospective adoptive parent, the possibility
existed that Warren & Warren would not only reveal the peti-
tioner’s confidences to the agency, but that it would reveal Angel
Guardian’s confidences as well.  For example, a prospective adop-
tive parent would likely be interested in learning about an agency’s
adherence to mandates concerning the adoption process.  State
statutes, rules, regulations, and standards impose stringent require-
ments on agencies involved in the adoption process.78  However,
these requirements, while setting minimum standards, do not speak
to the quality of the services rendered.79  Therefore, there is no
74. Id. at § 421.15(c)(1).
75. Id. at § 421.16(p)(2).
76. Id. at § 421.15(c)(6).
77. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.15 (1981).
78. JOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 7-16 (1988).
79. Id. at 7-17.
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guarantee the particular agency that a prospective adoptive parent
utilizes to facilitate an adoption will have provided appropriate ser-
vices to meet the needs of that adoptive parent and the child to be
adopted.80
In addition, when a child is available for adoption, the agency
must evaluate the child’s needs,81 arrange for a medical examina-
tion to determine the state of the child’s health (including identify-
ing significant factors that may interfere with normal
development),82 train and recruit prospective adoptive parents,83
and provide post-adoption services which can continue for up to
three years.84  In evaluating a child, however, the agency might be
prone to downplay the needs of an emotionally dependant child in
order to facilitate a faster adoption, or may fail to report factors
that may interfere with the development of the child, terming them
not significant.  While regulations may require that the agency dis-
close information concerning the health, social, educational, and
genetic history of the child,85 a prospective adoptive parent may
want to know more.  The putative adoptive parent or the child to be
adopted may want to know who the child’s biological parents are.86
An attorney with access to the agency’s confidential records might
be inclined to share the information with his client.  While a foster
care agency might assume its confidences will not be revealed, an
attorney who is privy to this information and who represents puta-
tive adoptive parents may feel compelled to disclose this informa-
tion in his client’s best interest.
Allowing a law firm to represent a foster care agency in a pa-
rental rights termination proceeding and subsequently represent
the person seeking adoption of the same child presents many ad-
vantages, both to the child and to the parties involved.  However,
when the law firm maintains an ongoing relationship with the fos-
80. Id. 
81. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.8(f) (1981).
82. Id. at § 421.8(e).
83. Id. at § 421.8(h)(1).
84. Id. at § 421.8(h)(2)(ii).
85. HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 78, at 7-28.
86. When adopting a child from an authorized agency, New York Domestic Law
requires that none of the papers concerning the adoption proceeding contain the
child’s surname.  This precludes the adoptive parents from determining the identity of
the child’s biological parents.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112 (4) (McKinney 2004).
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ter care agency, particular problems arise, leading to an inherent
conflict of interest.  Courts should narrow permissible types of rep-
resentation to exclude these types of inherent conflicts of interest.
This would deter impropriety, or at least the appearance of impro-
priety, bolster public confidence in the judicial system87 and, at the
same time, further the public interest by finding a permanent
home for the child.88
87. Gustavo, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (Tom, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 19.
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